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Where Institutional Logics of Corporate 
Governance Collide: Overstatement of Compliance 
in a Developing Country, Bangladesh. 
 
ABSTRACT 
Manuscript Type:  Empirical 
Research Question/Issue:  How do conflicting institutional logics predict and explain the 
overstatement of corporate governance compliance in a developing country? 
Research Findings/Insights:  A unique opportunity to study overstatement of compliance is 
available through checklists published in annual reports by companies in Bangladesh. A data 
set contrasting with that available from the checklists is collected by a confidential survey of 
company secretaries.  Overstatement of compliance with the country’s Corporate Governance 
Guideline issued in 2006 is measured by comparing the published compliance with that 
revealed by the survey.  There is significant overstatement of compliance in annual reports, 
particularly with respect to the less directly observable provisions of the Guideline.  The 
overstatement is positively associated with control by a sponsor family and is negatively 
associated with the presence of an institutional investor on the board of directors.   
Theoretical/Academic Implications:  The logic associated with the regulative framework of 
an Anglo-American-based corporate governance model conflicts with the logic of a cultural-
cognitive institutional framework in a developing country.  The resulting contest of 
legitimacy motivates firms to overstate compliance with the Corporate Governance Guideline 
2006 in annual reports.  
Practitioner/Policy Implications:  This study highlights the challenges of introducing an 
Anglo-American model of corporate governance in a developing country.  National and 
international investors should seek to understand the reality of the corporate governance 
structure of firms in developing countries, rather than relying solely on compliance reported 
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in annual reports.  For researchers, there may be limitations in using the compliance reported 
in annual reports as a measure of corporate governance. 
 
Key words:  Corporate Governance, Competing Institutional Logics, Overstatement of 
Compliance, Family Control, Institutional Investor Director, Bangladesh.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In Bangladesh, as in other developing countries, a corporate governance (CG) guideline has 
been introduced based on an Anglo-American approach (Siddiqui, 2010).  This brings a 
regulative institutional context to the implementation of CG.  In contrast, the country’s 
traditional governance of family-controlled firms is based within a cultural-cognitive context 
(Uddin & Choudhury, 2008).  In this paper, the regulative and the cultural-cognitive contexts 
and their respective logics, which Scott (2014:60) describes as instrumentality and orthodoxy, 
are contrasted in order to predict and explain observed overstated reporting of CG 
compliance in Bangladesh.  
Prior firm-level studies on CG codes mostly investigate the level of compliance with 
national codes and on the association between the level of compliance with codes and firm 
performance (see recent review by Cuomo, Mallin and Zattoni, 2015:10). In the works on 
compliance with CG codes, scepticism is evident around congruity between compliance as 
stated in compliance statements and actual governance arrangements. For example, 
Akkermans et al. (2007:1109) cautioned that compliance rates based on public information 
may overstate actual compliance. The level of overstatement could be significant in 
developing countries because institutional characteristics of developing countries (e.g., 
cultural characteristics and the existence of institutional voids) are not supportive of effective 
implementation of an Anglo-American model of CG (Wanyama et al., 2009). Theoretical 
development also suggests that organizations choose ‘window-dressing’ to conceal non-
conformity with a formal compliance program while they face competing institutional logics 
(Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta and Lounsbury, 2011:349; Pache & Santos, 2010; 
Oliver, 1991). However, investigation of overstatement of compliance with a national code 
has not featured to any meaningful degree in the empirical work. The suspicion around the 
congruity between compliances as stated in compliance statements and actual governance 
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arrangements, together with the above-mentioned theoretical development, provide the 
motivation for the investigation of overstatement of compliance in a developing country. 
The context of Bangladesh, as an example of a developing country, is chosen due to 
an interesting data source available.  Although the CG guideline is based upon the principle 
of ‘comply or explain’, the regulator requires a checklist to be published in annual reports, 
specifying ‘compliance’ or ‘non-compliance with an explanation’ with each provision of the 
Bangladesh Corporate Governance Guidelines-2006 (BSEC, 2006).  Having observed in a 
preliminary review of corporate annual reports that compliance reported in the checklists 
appeared to be uniformly high, a questionnaire survey is used to establish whether such high 
compliance existed in reality.  In prior research on Bangladesh, Uddin and Choudhury (2008) 
used interviews to show that a traditionalist culture mediates the rationalist/legalist 
framework of CG. The respondents indicated that it was not unusual, in family-controlled 
businesses, to find family members were instructing their accountants to prepare favorable 
reports for important stakeholders such as creditors, the Bangladesh Securities and Exchange 
Commission (BSEC) and stock exchange officials.  However, the World Bank (2009) 
reported a significant improvement in CG practices, finding an average level of 82 percent 
compliance based upon information reported in the annual report.  Comparing these two 
sources indicates a high probability of overstatement of compliance in annual reports.  
Overstatement behavior is hypothesized in this paper, in terms of competing institutional 
logics, as the orthodoxy logic of a cultural-cognitive pillar, competing with the 
instrumentality logic of a regulative pillar. 
Overstatement is investigated by matching the responses to survey questions put to 91 
companies in 2012 with the published accounts of their CG compliance. Results show a 
statistically significant overstatement of CG compliance in the annual reports.  Control by the 
sponsor family is directly associated with overstatement. The presence of an institutional 
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investor representative on the board of directors is inversely associated with overstatement.  
In both cases the overstatement is more pronounced in respect of those CG requirements that 
are not directly observable externally.   
The contribution of the paper is to demonstrate that observed overstatement behavior 
can be an outcome of conflict at the organizational field level, organizational level and actor 
level. On the one hand the regulative logic of instrumentality causes firms to report high 
compliance in order to achieve legally sanctioned legitimacy in the eyes of the domestic 
regulatory agencies and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the World 
Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund.  On the other hand 
the cultural-cognitive logic of orthodoxy causes businesses to avoid implementing CG 
procedures in reality.  Family-controlled businesses overstate compliance more due to the 
‘cognitive consistency’ of organizational structures of family-controlled firms and in order to 
protect private benefits of control afforded by controlling shareholder family due to the 
existence of ‘institutional voids’. The maintenance of ‘cognitive consistency’ is explained by 
Scott (2014:74) as the legitimation of the ‘structural template.’  The presence of an 
institutional investor representative on the board of directors modifies the power structure and 
encourages more compliance with the Anglo-American model.  However, even here 
overstatement remains, albeit reduced.  The instrumental logic of institutional investors is an 
incomplete challenge to the orthodoxy of family-controlled firms. The findings of this paper 
suggest that due to coercive pressures from the IFIs and BSEC, companies attempt to 
maintain regulative legitimacy by overstating compliance in annual reports as they cannot 
implement the recommended CG practices due to the orthodoxy logic of cultural-cognitive 
institutions. Thus, two apparently contradictory findings reported by Uddin and Choudhury 
(2008) and the World Bank (2009) are reconciled by this paper. 
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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN BANGLADESH 
This section describes the process of adoption of an Anglo-American-based CG guideline in 
Bangladesh highlighting aspects of the cultural-cognitive framework of Bangladesh that were 
in conflict with an Anglo-American style of CG guideline. 
Following the Bangladesh stock market crash of 1996, the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) funded an $80 million project to transform the country’s capital markets (ADB, 
1997).  One objective was to produce a comprehensive manual of CG for public limited 
companies and issuers of securities.  That project was assisted by a US consultant, The Aries 
Group Ltd, who formulated a CG guideline consistent with the Principles of Corporate 
Governance 1999 (OECD, 1999) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (ADB, 2005).  The BSEC adopted the guideline in 2006 (BSEC, 2006).  It is 
described hereafter as the BCGG-2006 (Bangladesh Corporate Governance Guideline 2006). 
The BCGG-2006 is recognized in the listing rules of both the Dhaka and Chittagong Stock 
Exchanges, in a manner typical of an Anglo-American governance code (Uddin & 
Choudhury, 2008).  Siddiqui (2010:269) noted that the BCGG-2006 was ‘remarkably similar’ 
to the voluntary Bangladesh Corporate Governance Code-2004 (BCGC-2004) previously 
issued (BEI, 2004) by the Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI). The BEI is a private-sector 
think-tank organization which, funded by the IFIs, first studied the CG practices in 
Bangladesh (BEI, 2003) and subsequently issued the BCGC-2004 (BEI, 2004) as an initiative 
to improve CG practices.  Siddiqui (2010) argued that by adopting the BCGG-2006 
resembling the BCGC-2004, the BSEC demonstrated its legitimacy to the IFIs.  
However, wider cultural, social, regulatory and political factors in Bangladesh may 
lead to tensions with such Anglo-American-based CG practices.  Bangladesh is characterised 
as a country with high levels of collectivism and power distance (Hofstede, Hofstede & 
Minkov, 2010).  The promotion of incompetent family members and associates at the 
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expense of talented individuals (Ahsan, 2010), and the concentration of authority and power 
at the top is evident in every sphere of life, from political parties to business organizations 
(Kochanek, 2000).  As in other countries with a similar cultural profile (Chakrabarty, 2009), 
family ownership dominated in Bangladesh long before Independence in 1971 (Kochanek, 
1996).  The large corporations, nationalized as a result of independence, were returned to 
families after 1975 when Bangladesh adopted market-based capitalism (Belal & Cooper, 
2011). The families were selected based upon their relationship with, and the amount of illicit 
payment that they could offer to, the contemporary ruling parties (Uddin & Choudhury, 
2008). The movement to market-based capitalism, however, was not supported by formal 
legal and regulatory institutions as they were dysfunctional (Uddin, 2009) but was 
implemented due to the intervention of the IFIs in development policies (Uddin & Hopper, 
2003).   
Since then, Bangladesh has achieved limited improvement in its formal legal and 
regulatory institutions. At present, Bangladesh suffers from a high level of corruption (TIB, 
2012), poor implementation and enforcement of regulations (World Justice Project, 2015), 
significant difficulties in enforcement of contracts (World Bank, 2014), a small and volatile 
stock market (The Aries Group Ltd, 2012), unavailability of credit rating information (IMF, 
2013), and a passive managerial labor market (Siddiqui, 2010). Several researchers regarded 
such a lack of formal legal and regulatory institutions as institutional voids (e.g., Khanna, 
Palepu, & Sinha, 2005; Peng & Jiang, 2010).  According to Chakrabarty (2009), institutional 
voids reinforce family ownership and control. Consequently, the ownership and management 
of Bangladeshi companies is concentrated in sponsor families and groups (Haque, Arun, & 
Kirkpatrick, 2011).  
A single sponsor family often controls a number of firms in the manufacturing, 
financial and service sectors (Nuruzzaman, 2004) indicating the family’s custody of a 
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formidable amount of economic resources. The controlling sponsor families can also easily 
ensure access to bank finance using their reputation, relationship and ability to provide 
collateral (Masum & Parker, 2013).  Most of the controlling sponsor families are either 
directly or indirectly politically connected with one of the two major political parties (Uddin, 
2009).  Consequently, several prior studies have depicted Bangladesh as an example of crony 
capitalism (Haque et al., 2011; Uddin & Hopper, 2003). The capital market is populated 
mostly by poorly-literate ill-informed retail ‘momentum’ investors (The Aries Group Ltd, 
2012). Consequently, a few business elites can manipulate the stock price, legally or illegally 
(Khaled, Chowdhury, Baree, & Kabir, 2011) and combat regulatory enforcement using 
‘political influence’ (Uddin, 2009:789). The controlling sponsor families take advantage of 
institutional voids to constrain accountability to general shareholders (BEI, 2003).  On the 
other hand, general shareholders do not challenge the controlling sponsor families in the 
annual general meeting (Uddin & Choudhury, 2008). 
The BCGG-2006 requires listed companies to include a checklist in their annual 
report specifying ‘compliance’ or ‘non-compliance with an explanation’ with each provision 
of the BCGG-2006.  In 2009, the World Bank, in a study of compliance with the BCGG-2006 
as reported in annual reports, found compliance, on average, with 82 per cent of the BCGG-
2006 provisions (World Bank, 2009:41).  The World Bank claimed this indicated a 
significant improvement in CG practices of firms.  An analysis of annual reports of the BSEC 
from 2007-8 to 2011-12 by the researcher revealed that around 75 percent of companies 
complied fully with the BCGG-2006 and the remaining (approximate) 25 per cent complied 
partly.  In contrast, Uddin and Choudhury (2008:1045), applying an interview method, found 
that companies in Bangladesh fail to comply with basic corporate rules and regulations, with 
the dominance of sponsor families weakening the state’s power in the enforcement of rules 
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and regulations. From survey evidence Haque et al. (2011) found that sponsor family control 
and political affiliation of directors hinder improvement in CG practices. 
The section on development of hypotheses discusses how conflicting logics predict 
that the circumstances prevailing in Bangladesh will lead to ‘window-dressing’ of reported 
compliance that exceeds the reality.  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Corporate governance codes based upon the Anglo-American model have been adopted by 
nations worldwide for reasons of efficiency and legitimacy (Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008).  
Legitimacy-based reasons have been particularly pronounced in developing countries (Reed, 
2002; Siddiqui, 2010).  Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) posited that, depending on the 
nature of the issuing authority, the adoption of a CG code creates different types of 
legitimacy pressures for compliance.  Non-compliance can result in a loss of external 
legitimacy.  
However, scholars have argued that an Anglo-American model is ‘unsuitable for 
developing country economies’ (Singh & Zammit, 2006:221) due to cultural characteristics 
(Lau & Young, 2013) and the existence of institutional voids (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, 
Bruton et al., 2008). Developing countries rank high with regard to collectivism and power 
distance relative to Anglo-American countries (Hofstede, 1980). Institutional voids also exist 
due to factors such as poor enforcement of regulations, difficulties in enforcement of 
contracts, high levels of corruption, and inefficiency of product, labor and capital markets 
(Khanna et al., 2005). Family-controlled businesses dominate due to cultural profile 
(Chakrabarty, 2009) and the existence of institutional voids (Peng & Jiang, 2010). At the 
same time, the existence of institutional voids creates an opportunity for the controlling 
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shareholder families to afford significant private benefits of control (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, 
Bruton et al., 2008).  
The implementation of a CG code which is based upon an Anglo-American model 
can be hindered by the distinct cultural and institutional characteristics of developing 
countries (Wanyama, Burton, & Helliar, 2009) and powerful interest groups who fear a 
reduction in the private benefits of control afforded to them by existing corporate governance 
practices (Bebchuk & Roe, 1999; DiMaggio, 1988).  Thus, firms’ responses toward 
compliance with a CG code based upon an Anglo-American model, in the context of 
developing countries, are subject to conflicting institutional demands. CG mechanisms based 
upon an Anglo-American model are also perceived as institutionally contested practices in 
developed countries where cultural and institutional characteristics are contrasting with those 
of Anglo-American countries (e.g., stock-based executive pay in Germany by Sanders and 
Tüschke, 2007; disclosure of individual executive pay in Germany by Chizema, 2008; 
shareholder value orientation in the Netherlands by Bezemer, Zajak, Naumovska, Van Den 
Bosch et al., 2015).  
The structure of the organizational field fundamentally shapes the nature and extent of 
competing institutional logics which organizations face (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, 
Micelotta et al., 2011:334).  Organizations more likely face competing institutional demands 
when the organizational field is fragmented (Pache & Santos, 2010).  A fragmented 
organizational field refers to a number of uncoordinated constituents motivated by competing 
institutional logics to exert competing demands (Scott & Meyer, 1991). Organizations facing 
competing institutional logics are often subject to contradictory regulative, normative and 
cultural-cognitive logics (Kraatz & Block, 2008:243). According to Scott (2014:74), a 
prescription that conflicts with the cultural-cognitive element lacks a taken-for-granted status. 
Legitimacy gains from implementation of such prescription remain unclear to organizations 
11 
 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), as organizational responses to a prescription which may be 
perceived legitimate by one constituent may be perceived illegitimate by another (Scott, 
2014:73).  Under such conditions, organizations must maintain ‘pluralistic legitimacy’ 
(Kraatz & Block, 2008:249). In order to gain and maintain ‘pluralistic legitimacy’, 
organizations exercise some level of strategic choice when selecting their responses (Oliver, 
1991; Pache & Santos, 2010).  
Organizations facing competing institutional logics strategically select one or more of 
the following strategies; compromise, avoidance, manipulation and defiance, in order to gain 
and maintain legitimacy, as proposed by Oliver (1991) and developed more explicitly by 
Pache and Santos (2010).  Compromise involves balancing, pacifying and bargaining with 
institutional referents (Oliver, 1991; Scott, 2014:211) which is less likely to be achievable in 
the case of a formal compliance program (Jamali, 2010).  Pache and Santos (2010:464) 
emphasize that manipulation and defiance requires ‘overt contestation of institutional 
demands’ leading to loss of organizational legitimacy to the constituents who recommend 
new practice.  This suggests that an avoidance strategy, more particularly ‘window-dressing’ 
to conceal non-conformity with institutional demands, can be a feasible strategic choice with 
respect to a formal compliance program. Oliver (1991) cites Meyer and Rowan (1977) who 
indicate that concealment tactics such as ‘window-dressing’ involve disguising 
nonconformity behind a facade of acquiescence. ‘Window-dressing’ is synonymous with the 
concept of ‘decoupling’ as pioneered by Westphal and Zajak (1994), which indicates a 
situation whereby organizations declare the adoption of CEO long-term incentive plans 
without their actual implementation.  Jamali (2010), using the framework of Oliver (1991), 
investigated managerial perceptions of institutional antecedents of compliance with the 
International Accountability Standards. She demonstrated that managerial perceptions of 
institutional antecedents correspond most closely to a strategic response of avoidance.  
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This study argues that the reporting of compliance in annual reports differs from 
actual implementation at the organizational level with respect to adoption of an Anglo-
American model in developing countries, as the policy is recommended by a regulative 
institutional profile but less favored by a cultural-cognitive institutional profile.  
Organizational-level dynamics further create variation in strategic responses to an 
institutionally contested new practice (Fiss, Kennedy and Davis, 2012).  Shipilov, Greve and 
Rowley (2010) demonstrated that organizations with internal authority structures sharing the 
contrasting logic underlying a new practice will more likely resist the implementation of the 
new practice. Organizational-level dynamics such as organizational goals, culture and 
authority relations are difficult and costly to change (Rao, Morrill & Zald, 2000:240).  Hence, 
organizations with goals, culture and authority relations based upon institutional logic 
competing with that of the new practice are under more pressure to ‘window-dress’ 
compliance with the practice to gain and maintain legitimacy (Oliver, 1991).  
Individual-level experiences and identities of internal actors influence their cognitive 
processes as to their understanding of what is a legitimate organizational response under 
conflicting institutional pressures (George, Chattopadhyay, Sitkin, & Barden, 2006).  The 
relative power and influence of internal actors will create variation in organizational 
responses since those which protect the interests of external audiences may hinder the 
interests of internal actors.  Both theory (Pache & Santos, 2010:465; Oliver, 1991) and 
empirics (Fiss & Zajak, 2004; Westphal & Zajak, 2001) suggest that when the personal 
interests of managers are potentially threatened by the adoption of a new practice, the 
selection of an avoidance strategy is more likely to maintain legitimacy to external 
constituents.  
Internal actors can be heterogeneous in terms of their goals and interests (Greenwood 
& Hinings, 1996). Each group may attempt to influence organizational responses for its own 
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benefit. In such a case, the relative bargaining strength of internal actors affects the strategic 
responses of organizations (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta et al., 2011). More 
specifically, Pache and Santos (2010) posited that when internal groups representing two 
sides of conflicting institutional pressures have the power to influence decisions, the 
likelihood of using an avoidance strategy is reduced.  
However, the practicality of gaining and maintaining legitimacy by using an 
avoidance strategy depends on the level of information asymmetry that firms can maintain 
with respect to the practice (Crilly, Zollo & Hansen, 2012).  The external constituents 
recommending change cannot easily observe firms’ internal practices (Christmann & Taylor, 
2001).  Consequently, firms are more successful in using an avoidance strategy with respect 
to internal practices rather than externally observable practices (Crilly et al., 2012). Hence, 
this study argues that the difference between compliance reported in annual reports and actual 
implementation which prevails at the organizational level will be higher with respect to CG 
provisions that are less observable externally. 
This section has discussed the role of the organizational field, the organization and the 
individuals within organizations and information asymmetry in selecting an avoidance 
strategy as an organizational response to competing institutional logics.  Using this literature, 
the next section develops the hypotheses.    
 
HYPOTHESES 
Non-conformance with coercive pressures created by regulatory agencies threatens a firm’s 
regulative legitimacy (Ruef & Scott, 1998).  Prior research around compliance with CG codes 
indicates that apparent over-compliance is triggered by regulative legitimacy (Arcot, Bruno, 
& Faure-Grimaud, 2010).  In Bangladesh, Siddiqui (2010:270) explains that coercive and 
mimetic forces allowed the BEI and BSEC to demonstrate their legitimacy to the IFIs and 
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respond to perceived legitimacy threats by adopting an Anglo-American CG model. Coercive 
pressures on firms may have been created by the BEI in drawing on a wide range of key 
players to write the BCGC-2004 (BEI, 2004).  These pressures increased further when the 
BSEC adopted the BCGG-2006 drawn from the BCGC-2004 and the stock exchanges 
included the BCGG-2006 in their listing rules. The Corporate Finance Department (CFD) of 
the BSEC ensures that the statement of compliance with the BCGG-2006 is included in the 
annual reports of listed companies as part of its supervisory process (BSEC, 2012:34-35). A 
number of prior studies suggest that stock markets react positively to announcements of 
levels of compliance with CG codes (e.g., Goncharov, Werner, & Zimmermann, 2006; Alves 
& Mendes, 2004).
1
  Hence disclosure of ‘non-compliance without an explanation’ could be 
regarded by managers as a threat to regulative legitimacy.  
However, cultural and institutional profiles of Bangladesh, as in many other 
developing countries, act as deterrents not only for managers’ motivation to present 
themselves as accountable but also for shareholders’ motivation and ability to monitor 
managers. Bangladesh is characterized as a country with high levels of collectivism and 
power distance. Cultures of strong collectivism, underestimating the value of personal 
competence and talent in career advancement, reduce the accountability of managers 
(Hooghiemstra, Hermes & Emanuels, 2015). Conversely, cultures of high collectivism, 
deemphasizing the importance of personal judgement in investment decision making, reduce 
the monitoring ability of shareholders (Chan & Cheung, 2008). Cultures with high levels of 
power distance, invoking power and wealth differentials between managers and shareholders 
(Fidrmuc & Jacob, 2010), stimulate managerial entrenchment and shareholders 
powerlessness (Chan & Cheung, 2008). This, in turn, reduces the need for managers to 
present them as accountable to shareholders. 
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In Bangladesh, the projected careers of managers depend upon their kinship and 
relationship with powerful families rather than their personal competence and talent (Uddin 
and Choudhury, 2008). The consecutive crashes of stock markets and constant high volatility 
of stock prices in Bangladesh (Hossain, 2013) suggest limited application of independent 
personal judgement by the general shareholders. The AGM is stage-managed by managers to 
limit shareholders’ participation in decision making process and to limit dividend payments 
(Uddin & Choudhury, 2008).  General shareholders are found to be reluctant to speak out in 
AGMs (BEI, 2003) possibly indicating their acceptance of their powerlessness.  This 
behavior suggests that the concepts of accountability advocated by an Anglo-American 
model are not well ‘recognizable and located within the set of the widely held cognitive 
structures’ (Sanders & Tüschke, 2007:33) of managers and shareholders in Bangladesh. 
Institutional voids are the result of institutional characteristics such as high levels of 
corruption, high inefficiencies in the judicial systems. Such institutional voids induce 
managers to resort to the unofficial economy (Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann, & Zoido-
Lobaton, 2000) and reduce managerial transparency in accounting and governance (Bushman, 
Piotroski, & Smith, 2004). They also constrain the monitoring ability of shareholders 
(Klapper & Love, 2004). Under high levels of corruption, firms are required to make illicit 
payments to government officials and crime organizations in order to obtain scarce resources 
and protect their interests (Uddin & Hopper, 2003:749, Li, 2013). Furthermore, significant 
difficulty in enforcement of contracts threatens confidentiality of proprietary information 
(Morck, 2007) and creates uncertainty towards the protection of rights on general and 
intellectual properties (Bushman et al., 2004).  
Because of illicit payments, firms maintain strong secrecy and control over the 
preparation of accounting reports (Uddin, 2009:789), comply poorly with International 
Accounting Standards (Mir & Rahaman, 2005) and make limited disclosure (Akhtaruddin, 
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2005). Effective implementation of the BCGG-2006 could create uncertainty by revealing 
proprietary information and unethical practices of firms. This suggests that larger belief 
systems and the reality of daily life experienced by managers are not consistent with an 
Anglo-American model that asks for rule-based formal practices, openness and transparency 
(Judge, 2012).  On the other hand, shareholders cannot enforce their legal rights as the 
judicial systems of Bangladesh are inefficient and corrupt (The Aries Group Ltd., 2012). 
Finally, from the annual report of the BSEC it would appear that the CFD does not 
investigate compliance in depth, whilst the Enforcement Department (ED) has not taken any 
identifiable action in relation to compliance with the BCGG-2006.  Historically the CFD has 
been small in number and limited in relevant qualifications (The Aries Group Ltd., 2012).   
The consequence of strong cultural-cognitive logics and the lack of effectiveness of 
regulative logics means that firms may engage in ‘window-dressing’ to conceal their non-
conformity with the BCGG-2006 and appear to prove their regulative legitimacy to the BSEC 
and stock exchanges. Hence, the first hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H1: There is a significant level of overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-2006 
as reported in annual reports. 
 
Legitimacy is determined by mutual observations between managers and external 
constituents who recommend institutional change and observe managers’ actions (Seidl, 
2007). Hence, the level of information asymmetry plays an important role in determining 
organizational responses (Crilly et al., 2012). With respect to CG codes, Seidl (2007:713) 
hypothesized that conformance between compliance with CG codes declared by managers 
and what is actually put into action depends considerably on the extent to which external 
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constituents are able to assess the conformance.  The BCGG-2006 contains provisions that 
can be divided into more observable and less observable categories as explained later. 
Hence, it is hypothesized:  
 
H1a: The extent of overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-2006 is higher with 
respect to the provisions of the BCGG-2006 which are less observable by outsiders. 
 
One of the major characteristics of companies in Bangladesh is family ownership and 
control, an important feature of many developing countries (e.g., Peng & Jiang, 2010; Young 
et al., 2008). The IFIs and their supporters (e.g., Morck, Wolfenzon & Yeung, 2005) argue 
that family ownership and control are the root causes of CG problems in developing countries 
(Singh & Zammit, 2006) and advocate CG policies targeting reduction in family control 
(World Bank, 2002). In Bangladesh, the IFIs first act through their funded research 
organization, the BEI. In its study of CG practices the BEI argues that ‘closely-held family 
ownership leads to limited transparency and accountability’ (BEI, 2003:109). Subsequently, 
cognisant of this view, the domestic regulators attempted to dilute family control.
2
 This may 
suggest that threats to regulative legitimacy resulting from non-compliance with the BCGG-
2006 without explanation are more pronounced for family-owned and controlled firms. By 
disclosing compliance with the BCGG-2006 in annual reports, family-controlled firms can 
alleviate pressures from the IFIs and domestic regulators. 
However, family ownership and control are embedded in a nexus of cultural profile 
and institutional voids of Bangladesh.  High levels of collectivism supplemented by 
difficulties in enforcement of contracts encourage family owners to retain ownership and 
control of their business activities within their extended families (Chakrabarty, 2009). High 
levels of collectivism promote centralized authority (Li & Harrison, 2008). High levels of 
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power distance favor hierarchical organizational structures (Hofstede, 1980).  In Bangladesh, 
family owners are reluctant to appoint, and relinquish authority to, outside professional 
managers (Uddin & Choudhury, 2008).  They maintain extremely centralized and 
hierarchical organizational structures. It could be argued that the organizational structure of 
family-controlled firms in Bangladesh achieves ‘cognitive consistency’ (Scott, 2014:74) as it 
is based on a cultural-cognitive element. However, this organizational and management 
structure is inconsistent with the type of formal and decentralized CG structure advocated by 
an Anglo-American model (Judge, 2012).  Change in corporate culture is difficult and costly, 
more especially when a change in an organizational culture will conflict with the social 
cultural and institutional profile (Rao et al., 2000). Furthermore, potential extra benefits from 
the effective implementation of the BCGG-2006 are inadequate, as stock markets in 
Bangladesh are small and family-controlled firms can easily gain access to finance from 
banks (Masum & Parker, 2013).  
The case study evidence provided by Uddin (2009) shows that control by family 
members and their few trusted managers helps the firm gather updated market data on its own 
sales positions and those of its competitors on a day-to-day basis, use managerial expertise 
across group companies and use surplus cash to finance associated companies. This evidence 
is consistent with prior evidence in developing countries that family-controlled group firms 
fill the voids created by the absence of institutions that support efficient functioning of 
markets for product, labor and capital (Khanna & Rivkin, 2001, Khanna et al., 2005). The 
effective implementation of the BCGG-2006 may constrain the ability of controlling families 
to use resources across group firms.  
The existence of institutional voids, at the same time, creates an opportunity for the 
controlling shareholder families to afford significant private benefits of control (Young, 
Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton et al., 2008; Peng & Jiang, 2010). In   Bangladesh, the controlling 
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shareholder family are found to expropriate company resources by paying salaries and other 
benefits to family cronies who make no contribution to the company (Uddin, 2009).  The 
effective implementation of the BCGG-2006 would reduce the opportunities for such private 
benefits of control.  Hence, the following testable hypothesis: 
H2: Overstatement of compliance with the BCGG- 2006, as reported in annual 
reports, is positively associated with family control. 
 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) argued that firms resisting change try to keep internal 
structures unaltered in order to maintain efficiency.  It is more difficult for regulatory 
authorities to reveal overstatement with respect to less observable provisions as these 
provisions are subject to level of information asymmetry. Hence, to assess the roles of more 
observable and less observable provisions of the BCGG-2006, this study tests each of the 
following hypotheses. 
 
H2a: Overstatement of compliance with respect to observable provisions of the 
BCGG- 2006, as reported in annual reports, is not associated with family control. 
H2b: Overstatement of compliance with respect to less observable provisions of the 
BCGG- 2006, as reported in annual reports, is positively associated with family 
control. 
 
The relative power of heterogeneous internal constituents actively influences 
organizational actions (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta et al., 2011) as each group 
may attempt to influence organizational responses for its own benefit (Pache & Santos 2010).  
DiMaggio (1988:14) argued that ‘new institutions arise when organized actors with sufficient 
resources see in them an opportunity to realize interests that they value highly’.  Ownership 
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of the constituents often determines their relative power in a firm (Fiss & Zajak, 2004). 
Amongst different ownership groups, independent institutional investors are more powerful 
in terms of uniformity of demand as they provide significant amount of resources and can act 
independently of the insider’s agenda (Almazan, Hartzell, & Starks, 2005). Prior research has 
demonstrated that independent institutional investors prefer an Anglo-American model as it 
emphasizes maximization of shareholder value (Bezemer, Zajac, Naumovska, Van Den 
Bosch et al., 2015; Chizema, 2008) and take actions in line with an Anglo-American model to 
protect their legitimacy in a contested environment (Bates & Hennessy, 2010).  
The institutional investors, who are independent of sponsor families, could provide a 
force to discourage overstatement.  In Bangladesh, the institutional investors are represented 
on the board of directors (World Bank, 2009) when they own a significant percentage of 
shares. Thus, representation of an institutional investor on board indicates a firm’s relatively 
high resource dependence on institutional investors.  The presence of a powerful external 
representative on the board with a divergent interest is likely to create pressure on insiders for 
at least symbolic compliance with the BCGG-2006 and thus could reduce the overstatement 
of compliance. Due to the high social position of institutional investors in Bangladesh and 
pressure from the IFIs, who continuously criticise them for their inactivity (see, e.g., The 
Aries Group Ltd, 2012), institutional investors may also have an interest in protecting their 
own legitimacy. The CEO of the first private sector mutual fund company was included in the 
working group of the BEI in the formulation of the voluntary BCGC-2004 (BEI, 2004). The 
participation by this CEO indicates support from institutional investors for an Anglo-
American model of CG to be developed in Bangladesh.
3  
Prior interview evidence provided 
by Uddin and Choudhury (2008) has also indicated that the presence of a representative of an 
institutional investor on a board of directors improves CG practices. Hence, this study 
hypothesizes: 
21 
 
H3: Overstatement of compliance with the BCGG- 2006, as reported in annual 
reports, is negatively associated with the presence of an institutional investor 
representative on the board. 
However, family-controlled firms that overstate compliance run the risk of 
undermining their regulative legitimacy if the overstatement is subsequently revealed by the 
regulatory agencies. This indicates that externally observable provisions are more likely to be 
implemented due to fear of revelation by regulatory authorities. Institutional investor 
directors’ ability to reduce overstatement with respect to observable provisions will be less 
pronounced. Consequently, to assess the roles of more observable and less observable 
provisions of the BCGG-2006, this study tests each of the following hypotheses. 
 
H3a: Overstatement of compliance with respect to observable provisions of the 
BCGG- 2006, as reported in annual reports, is not associated with the presence of an 
institutional investor representative on the board. 
H3b: Overstatement of compliance with respect to less observable provisions of the 
BCGG- 2006, as reported in annual reports, is negatively associated with the 
presence of an institutional investor representative on the board. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Sample and Data Collection 
The sample consists of 91 non-financial companies that responded to a questionnaire survey. 
The survey was conducted between January and March 2012 and addressed to company 
secretaries or chief financial officers (CFOs). The survey collected detailed data on 
compliance with the provisions of the BCGG-2006, family relationships among directors, the 
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composition of the board of directors and the ownership structure of the company. The 
detailed questionnaire
4
 probed beyond simple compliance with the items to be reported in 
annual reports as part of the compliance statement and consequently could not be answered 
purely by referring to the annual reports. I deliberately avoided direct questioning on 
overstatement and its motivation; as such questions could raise respondents’ awareness of 
overstatement. For the purpose of this study, compliance with 20 provisions of the BCGG-
2006 (see Table 1) as stated in the survey is selected as these provisions could be compared 
directly with compliance reported in annual reports.   
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
The questionnaire included both open and closed questions. The introductory letter 
accompanying the survey explained its purpose as to understand the underlying level of 
compliance with the provisions of the BCGG-2006. It assured anonymity of the respondents 
and their organizations (Van der Stede, Young, & Chen, 2005). The questionnaire was pre-
tested with two company secretaries. 
The survey instrument was mailed to all 136 non-financial companies listed on the 
Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE), Bangladesh as at 31 December, 2011.  The names of company 
secretaries or CFOs and the addresses of companies’ headquarters were retrieved from 
Central Depository Bangladesh Limited.
5 
 Banks and financial institutions were excluded as 
they are subject to other CG rules issued by different regulatory authorities. I personally 
visited companies whose registered offices are situated in Dhaka and persuaded the company 
secretaries or CFOs to participate in the survey in the form of a structured interview. During 
the visits, I assured anonymity frequently. Alumni connections assisted in reaching the 
respondents. Loyalty might also have featured in the willingness to participate where the 
alumni connection generated some trust between the respondents and the researcher. The 
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total of 91 usable responses represented a response rate of 66.91 percent was obtained.  In 
order to test for response bias, respondents were compared with the population on the basis of 
industry sectors, family control, market capitalization and total assets (Wallace & Mellor, 
1988).  As shown in Table 2, no significant difference was indicated by a chi-square test in 
the distribution of companies across any of these categories.  
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
In order to have available the most recent accounting information at the date of the 
survey, annual reports were collected for all 136 non-financial companies, for the financial 
year 2011 Reports were obtained in printed format, from the BSEC and DSE Libraries.  
Data Analysis 
For each company two measures of compliance with the BCGG-2006 were constructed.  One 
was compliance as reported in the annual reports and the other was compliance as stated in 
the survey. These two variables were each accumulated as totals with a maximum of 20, 
using a binary indicator [1 for compliance and 0 for non-compliance] for each governance 
provision. ‘Non-compliance with an explanation’ is an ambiguous item creating coding 
difficulty as nominally it constitutes compliance according to the ‘comply or explain 
principle’ but is in reality  it is non-compliance. In the sample, there were 13 companies who 
used the ‘non-compliance with an explanation’ facility for a total of 42 provisions ranging 
from one to 12 provisions.   However, scrutiny of the reasons given indicated poor quality 
excuses rather than explanations, which made any coding of those items potentially 
ambiguous.  One common example of such an explanation is ‘under process’, [i.e. not yet 
implemented] as used by 10 companies for a total of 39 provisions. Two companies provided 
size-related justification and one company claimed the scarcity of CEOs with relevant 
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industry-related expertise for not separating the position of chairman and CEO.   Hence, those 
particular characteristics were excluded from both the compliance as reported in annual 
reports and compliance as stated in the survey.  Where a company uses explanation for non-
compliance, it has a lower overstatement value
6
 than the company which gives no 
explanation and hence any bias is against the predicted direction.  The omission of the 
‘explained’ items as used in this study means the analysis only focuses on the deliberate 
concealment of non-compliance with the BCGG-2006.  This binary coding method of 
measuring CG is based on Gompers, Ishii, and Metriek (2003) and is extensively used by 
subsequent researchers (see, e.g., Ammann, Oesch, & Schmid, 2011; Bebchuk, Cohen, & 
Ferrell, 2009).  
Overstated compliance is defined as the extent to which compliance as reported in 
annual reports exceeds compliance as stated in the survey. This study measured it by 
calculating the difference between compliance as reported in annual reports and compliance 
as stated in the survey, scaling the difference by compliance as reported in annual reports.  
Overstated compliance =  
(Compliance as reported in the annual reports – Compliance as stated in the survey) / 
Compliance as reported in the annual reports 
Subsequently, the 20 items as shown in Table 1 were classified into observable and 
less observable provisions. The nine observable provisions are those that are easily verifiable 
or subject to strong monitoring by regulatory authorities such as the BSEC and the stock 
exchanges.  Board meeting is categorized as an observable as companies are under a legal 
obligation to announce, through the stock exchange website, the time, date and venue of the 
meeting in advance, and the subsequent decisions taken. The 11 less observable provisions 
are related to the internal practices of the company and therefore, are relatively less visible to 
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an outside individual or organization. For instance, the existence of a written charter for the 
audit committee is classified as less observable as there is no regulatory requirement to 
submit the written charter of the audit committee to the BSEC, unlike the case in the USA. 
Based on this classification of provisions, four sub-indices were calculated as:  
compliance with observable provisions as reported in the annual reports;  
compliance with observable provisions as stated in the survey;  
compliance with less observable provisions as reported in the annual reports; and  
compliance with less observable provisions as stated in the survey. 
 Based on these four sub-indices, this study then calculated overstatement of 
observable and less observable provisions using formulae similar to that applied to overstated 
compliance.  
Family control is coded as 1, if an individual member or members of the founding 
family either directly or indirectly owns at least 20 per cent of the equity and occupies the 
positions of chairman and CEO; otherwise as 0. In the case of Bangladesh, ownership is 
concentrated and the sponsor family frequently holds the key governance and management 
positions. Hence, family ownership and family presence in key governance and management 
positions are combined. This definition of control by family is more aligned with Villalonga 
and Amit (2006) who argue that the familial nature of firms depends on three aspects: 
ownership, governance and management. This definition also signifies the power of the 
sponsor family (Klein, Astrachan, & Smyrnios, 2005:324).  
This study follows Pucheta-Martínez and García-Meca (2014) in defining institutional 
investor representatives on the board.  Institutional investor director is coded as 1, if at least 
one institutional investor representative sits on the board; otherwise the code is 0. 
To test H1, the mean of overstated compliance is compared with zero using a one 
sample t-test and the median with 0 using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test.  This study also 
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compared compliance as reported in annual reports and compliance as stated in the survey 
using a paired t-test of the means and a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test of the 
medians.  H1a is tested by comparing overstated compliance of observable provisions and 
overstated compliance of less observable provisions, using a paired t-test of the means and a 
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test of the medians. 
To test H2 and H3, this study used a Tobit regression, similar to Sakawa, Moriyama 
and Watanabel (2012) as the distribution of the overstated compliance has no negative values 
and so is truncated at the lower bound of 0. A Tobit regression is more appropriate than 
ordinary least square (OLS) to predict a truncated dependent variable as the use of OLS 
provides inconsistent estimates of the parameters (Wooldridge, 2002:668). In order to use a 
Tobit regression model, a logarithmic transformation is used to linearize the distribution of 
the overstated compliance.
7  
One is added to the value of overstated compliance before taking 
the log, as this variable is a ratio.  
The regression model is: 
Linearized overstated compliance = f (Family control, Institutional investor director, 
Controls) 
Linearized overstated compliance is replaced by linearized overstated compliance of 
observable provisions for testing H2a and H3a, and linearized overstated compliance of less 
observable provisions for testing H2b and H3b. The variables are defined in Table 3.  
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
 
This study selected control variables by assuming that overstatement of CG 
compliance with the BCGG-2006 is a function of external and internal legitimacy of CG. The 
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control variables are firm size, audit quality, prior year ROA, need to access external capital 
markets, market-to-book ratio and export-oriented industry, explained as follows. 
First, larger firms have a greater need (Dedman, 2000) and better capacity 
(Akkermans, Van Ees, Hermes, Hooghiemstra et al., 2007:1109) to maintain a strong CG 
structure.  Larger firms, attracting more attention, are also more likely try to maintain their 
reputation by providing credible and trustworthy accounting reports (Cao, Myers & Omer, 
2012). Consequently, this study included a control for firm size using log of total assets. 
Second, prior research has shown that international auditors play an important role in 
the diffusion of western practices in emerging markets (Mennicken, 2008). On the other 
hand, firms with higher quality auditors encounter less external pressure for internal CG in 
emerging countries (Fan & Wong, 2005). The auditing profession in Bangladesh is 
underdeveloped and the Big 4 audit firms operate through local representatives. Kabir, 
Sharma, Islam, & Salat (2011) argue that these representatives maintain better audit quality 
due to monitoring by Big 4 audit firms. Following Kabir et al. (2011), this study uses a 
categorical variable where 1 represents the representatives of the Big 4 audit firms as a proxy 
for audit quality. 
Third, poor firm performance reduces external legitimacy and therefore, increases 
external pressure for better CG (Bates & Hennessy, 2010; Sanders & Tüschke, 2007). Firm 
performance is found to be negatively associated with decoupling with respect to CEO long-
term incentive plans (Westphal & Zajak, 1994). In respect of Bangladesh, Haque et al., 
(2011) find a positive association between profitability and the value of their survey-based 
CG index. Hence, better-performing firms may be less inclined to overstate compliance with 
BCGG-2006 in their annual reports. In line with Westphal and Zajak (1994) and Sanders and 
Tüschke (2007), this study included a control for prior year return on assets (ROA_1). 
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Fourth, prior research has demonstrated that firms can ensure better valuation of their 
initial public offerings by legitimizing their governance structure (Bell, Filatotchev, & 
Aguilera, 2014).  Although stock markets in Bangladesh are nascent, firms need the approval 
of the BSEC to raise finance by issuing equity, preference stock and a significant amount of 
long-term loans which may trigger overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-2006.  
Following Aier, Comprix, Gunlock and Lee (2005), this study measures the need to access 
external capital markets (Finance raised) by the ratio of additional cash raised from issuance 
of equity, preferred stock and long-term debt to average total assets in the accounting year 
ended in 2011.  
Fifth, as this study questions the reliability of disclosures in annual reports, it may not 
be sufficient to control only for accounting report-based variables.
8
 Therefore, this study also 
controls for market-to-book ratio defined as the ratio of market value of equity to book value 
of equity at the end of accounting period. 
Sixth, a number of prior studies provide evidence that the accountability of 
Bangladeshi manufacturers who make products for western retailers is influenced by the 
retailers (Islam & Deegan, 2010; Khan, Muttakin & Siddiqui, 2013).
9
 Following Khan et al. 
(2013), this study considers any firm in the textile and pharmaceutical industries as an export-
oriented industry and uses a dummy variable where 1 indicates firms in the textile and 
pharmaceutical industries. 
RESULTS 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics of the sample firms.  The mean of compliance as 
reported in annual reports is 16.25 and the mean of compliance as stated in the survey is 
11.04.  The minimum and maximum values of both compliance as reported in annual reports 
and compliance as stated in the survey are 3 and 20 respectively.  With respect to compliance 
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as reported in annual reports and compliance as stated in the survey, eight and five firms 
respectively have the maximum score of 20.  The values of compliance as reported in annual 
reports and compliance as stated in the survey of the other companies are within the range 3 - 
20.  No company has a value of compliance as stated in the survey greater than that of 
compliance as reported in annual reports. The mean (median) of overstated compliance in 
annual reports is 32 (31) percent and standard deviation is 25 percent.  The maximum value 
of overstated compliance in annual reports is 82 percent. The mean of overstated compliance 
of observable provisions is 16 percent while the mean of overstated compliance of less 
observable provisions is 48 percent. 
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
The sponsor family owns at least 20 percent of shares and members of the sponsor 
family occupy the positions of both chairman and CEO in the case of 51.64 percent of sample 
firms. Institutional investors occupy board positions in the case of 23.08 percent of sample 
firms. Other independent variables show sufficient variations, suggesting that it is meaningful 
to use these variables as controls in estimation of the association of family control and 
presence of institutional investor directors on the board with overstated compliance. 
Total Overstatement of Compliance  
The results of a one-sample t-test and a Wilcoxon signed-rank test suggest that the 
mean and median of overstated compliance in annual reports is significantly greater than 0 at 
the 1 percent level (Table 5).  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------- 
The mean (median) of compliance as reported in annual reports is also significantly 
greater than the mean (median) of compliance as stated in the survey at the 1 percent level 
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(see Table 6). The results, thus, support H1, indicating that, on average, the level of 
compliance as reported in the annual reports is not a reliable reflection of actual compliance 
with the BCGG-2006. 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------------- 
Overstated Observable and Less Observable Corporate Governance 
Table 7 shows that the mean and median of overstated compliance of less observable 
provisions are significantly higher than the respective values of overstated compliance of 
observable provisions at the 1 percent level.  This evidence provides support for H1a that 
overstatement of compliance in annual reports is higher for less observable provisions of the 
BCGG-2006. 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
------------------------------------- 
Association with Family Control and Institutional Investor Directors 
In Table 8, the mean differences of independent variables for total overstated 
compliance, overstated compliance of observable provisions, and overstated compliance of 
less observable provisions without and with overstatement of compliance in annual reports 
are presented, respectively, in Panels A and B.  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
------------------------------------- 
Panel A shows that the average of family control is higher for firms that overstate 
compliance in annual reports, implying that firms controlled by sponsor families tend to 
overstate compliance.  The presence of institutional investor directors is higher for firms with 
no overstatement of compliance.  The difference implies that when institutional investors 
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occupy positions on the board, they can play a part in reducing overstatement of compliance 
in annual reports.  Firms that do not overstate compliance with the BCGG-2006 in their 
annual reports are relatively larger in size, were more profitable in last accounting period, and 
are more proportionately audited by audit firms affiliated with an international Big 4 audit 
firm. However, there is no significant difference between firms without and those with 
overstatement of compliance in annual reports with respect to the percentage of finance 
raised from external markets, market-to-book ratio and firms belonging to export-oriented 
industries.  
Panel B presents the mean differences of independent variables without and with 
overstated compliance of observable provisions and overstated compliance of less observable 
provisions in annual reports.  The results of mean difference tests are almost identical to those 
of the total overstatement of compliance, with the exception that firms which overstate 
observable provisions raise more finance relative to total assets from external markets and 
have a higher market-to-book ratio. These results seem counter-intuitive.
10
 One possibility is 
that the differences in finance raised and market to book ratio, between firms that do not 
overstate and those that overstate observable provisions, are driven by differences in other 
firm-level characteristics. Indeed, in the multivariate estimation, both finance raised and 
market-to-book ratio do not maintain any significant association with overstated compliance 
of observable provisions.  
Results for Association with Family Control and Institutional Investor Directors 
In Table 9, the estimated results of the association of family control and presence of 
institutional investor directors on the board with total overstated compliance, overstated 
compliance of observable provisions, and overstated compliance of less observable 
provisions are presented, respectively, in Models 1, 2, and 3.  
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------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 about here 
------------------------------------- 
Model 1 (Table 9) shows that the coefficient of family control is positive and 
significant (β = 0.135, p < .001), indicating that control by the sponsor family is positively 
associated with the total overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-2006 in annual reports. 
This result supports H2. The results in Model 1 (Table 9) also reveal that the coefficient of 
institutional investor director is negative and significant (β = - 0.092, p < .05). This result 
supports H3. The coefficients of control variables indicate that firms that overstate 
compliance with the BCGG-2006 in annual reports raise a higher percentage of finance from 
external markets; are relatively smaller in size; were less profitable in the last accounting 
period and are less likely to be audited by audit firms affiliated with an international Big 4 
audit firm. 
Model 2 (Table 9) presents results of the association of control by sponsor family and 
institutional investor directors with overstatement with respect to observable provisions. The 
coefficients of family control and institutional investor director are insignificant, indicating 
that overstatement of compliance of observable provisions are apparently unaffected by 
control by the sponsor family and the presence of institutional investor directors on the board. 
This evidence supports H2a and H3a respectively. The coefficients of control variables 
suggest that larger firms and firms audited by audit firms affiliated with an international Big 
4 audit firms tend to overstate compliance less with respect to observable provisions.   
Model 3 (Table 9) presents results of the association of control by sponsor family and 
institutional investor directors with overstatement of compliance with respect to less 
observable provisions. The coefficient of family control is positive and significant (β = 0.155, 
p < .01), indicating that control by the sponsor family is positively associated with the 
overstatement of compliance of less observable provisions in annual reports. This result 
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supports H2b. The results in Model 3 (Table 9) also reveal that the coefficient of institutional 
investor directors is negative and significant (β = - 0.098, p < .05). This result supports H3b. 
Regarding the control variables, the results are identical to those of the total overstatement of 
compliance in annual reports, with the exception that percentage of finance raised from 
external markets is no longer significant at conventional level. 
Sensitivity Analysis for Association with Family Control and Institutional Investor 
Directors 
A series of tests is conducted to check the robustness of the results presented in Table 9.  
(The detailed results of these tests are not reported due to limitations of space but are 
available from the author upon request.) First, the untransformed values of overstated 
compliance, overstated compliance of observable provisions and overstated compliance of 
less observable provisions are regressed on the independent variables of Table 9. The 
estimated results are qualitatively identical to those in Table 9. Second, control by sponsor 
family is measured by using four alternative variables: (1) a dichotomous variable where 1 
indicates that an individual member or members of the sponsor family either directly or 
indirectly own at least 15 percent of ownership and occupy the positions of both chairman 
and CEO; 0 otherwise;
11
 (2) a dichotomous variable where 1 indicates that an individual 
member or members of the sponsor family either directly or indirectly own at least 30 percent 
of ownership and occupy the positions of both chairman and CEO; 0 otherwise; (3) both the 
chairman of the board and the CEO are members of the sponsor family following Yeh and 
Woidtke (2005); (4) either the chairman of the board or the CEO is a member of the sponsor 
family based on Ho and Wong (2001). All coefficients for variants of family control retain 
the level of significance and signs found in Table 9 with the following exception.  The 
coefficient of family control is significantly positively associated with overstated compliance 
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of observable provisions at the 5 percent level when family control is measured as a dummy 
variable indicating (a) the sponsor family owns at least 15 percent of ownership and sponsor 
family members hold the positions of both chairman and CEO; 0 otherwise and (b) both the 
chairman of the board and the CEO are members of the sponsor family; 0 otherwise. Third, 
the power of the institutional investor directors is measured by the percentage of institutional 
investor directors on the board as in Pucheta-Martínez and García-Meca (2014). The 
coefficient of percentage of institutional investor directors retains the level of significance 
and signs found in Table 9. Finally, in order to test whether institutional investor directors 
mitigate overstatement in family controlled companies; the linearized value of overstated 
compliance, overstated compliance of observable provisions and overstated compliance of 
less observable provisions are regressed on the institutional investor directors and the control 
variables of Table 9 for a reduced sample consisting of family-controlled firms only.
12
 The 
coefficients of institutional investor directors on linearized overstated compliance (β = - 
0.099, p < .05) and linearized overstated compliance of less observable provisions (β = - 
0.118, p < .05) are negative and significant. The coefficient of institutional investor directors 
on linearized overstated compliance of observable provisions is not statistically significant at 
the 10 percent level. These results provide further support for H3, H3a and H3b.   
To summarize, the results of the sensitivity checks provide support that the results in 
Table 9 are not apparently affected by linearization of the dependent variables and definitions 
of family control and institutional investor directors.    
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has examined the antecedents of overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-
2006. It has discussed how the introduction of an Anglo-American-based CG guideline to an 
organizational field characterised by contending cultural and institutional profile created 
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competing institutional logics and therefore, legitimacy contention.  Following competing 
institutional logics, this paper has developed three main hypotheses to evaluate the 
organizational field-level, the organizational level and the individual level antecedents of 
overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-2006. These main hypotheses are extended by 
incorporating the role of information asymmetry in selection of organizational strategic 
responses to an institutional pressure subject to competing logics. This study finds support for 
all eight proposed hypotheses.  
In Bangladesh, the most closely relevant prior study is by Uddin and Choudhury 
(2008) in which interviews were used to show that a traditionalist culture mediates the 
rationalist/legalist framework of CG in Bangladesh. Their findings suggest that CG practices 
recommended by the BCGG-2006 are not practised by companies in Bangladesh. Uddin and 
Choudhury (2008) make an implicit assumption that either the IFIs and the BSEC turn a 
completely blind eye to the state of compliance or the companies do not concern themselves 
with regulative legitimacy. However, some efforts by the IFIs (e.g. World Bank, 2009 finds 
that an average level of compliance is 82%) and the BSEC (e.g., the CFD ensures that the 
statement of compliance with CG guidelines is included in the annual report) are exercised to 
augment compliance and thus, create regulatory pressures. By providing evidence of 
overstatement, this study shows that companies maintain regulative legitimacy by reporting 
compliance with the BCGG-2006 in their annual reports, because the IFIs and the BSEC use 
the CG compliance statement to examine the state of compliance, whilst companies do not 
actually implement the practices recommended by the BCGG-2006 due to the contradiction 
with the cognitive-cultural framework. In so doing, this paper also reconciles the two 
contradictory prior findings as reported by Uddin and Choudhury (2008) and World Bank 
(2009). 
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In other developing countries, research on CG codes cautions that “the mere 
emergence of detailed governance codes in developing countries does not necessarily mean 
that de facto practices will improve” (Wanyama et al., 2009:159). This indicates a possible 
gap between compliances as stated in compliance statements and actual governance 
arrangements. This study, using an appropriate theoretical framework, demonstrates that the 
stated compliance with a national code as reported in annual reports is significantly higher 
than the reality of the underlying compliance. This study thus provides systematic empirical 
evidence to support the caution expressed by prior researchers. 
The contribution of this study to the literature of competing institutional logics  is a 
multilevel explanation of decoupling as a form of ‘window-dressing’ of compliance with a 
regulative institution, the BCGG-2006 that is challenged by the cultural-cognitive profile in 
the context of a developing country. Most studies of regulative legitimation focus on either 
diffusion of institutionally contested CG practices (Chizema, 2008; Sanders & Tüschke, 
2007; Fiss & Zajak, 2004) or policy-practice decoupling (Fiss & Zajak, 2006; Bezemer, 
Zajak, Naumovska, Van Den Bosch et al., 2015). This study, however, conceptualizes 
decoupling as a form ‘window-dressing’ of compliance as pioneered by Westphal & Zajak 
(1994; 2001) with a regulative institution, the BCGG-2006. The studies of Westphal & Zazaj 
(1994; 2001) are based on the USA and investigate the managers’ conflicting interests around 
decoupling. This study, however, investigates and finds supports for the organizational field-
level, the organizational level and the individual level antecedents of ‘window-dressing’ of 
compliance with a regulative institution in a developing country.  This study, thus, 
demonstrates that firms that ‘window-dress’ compliance are to some extent achieving 
regulative legitimation.  
This study identifies the Bangladesh CG arena as an organizational field subject to 
competing institutional logics. In this field, a regulative institution, such as adoption of the 
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BCGG-2006 and general capital market-oriented reforms, conflict with cultural-cognitive 
institutions creating a case for legitimacy contention for firms with respect to compliance 
with the BCGG-2006.  Whilst this identification is not new in CG literature (Bezemer, Zajak, 
Naumovska, Van Den Bosch, 2015; Chizema, 2008; Sanders & Tüschke, 2007), most of 
these studies focused upon developed non-Anglo-American countries which do not suffer 
from ‘formal institutional voids’ which prevail in developing countries. In contrast, this study 
focused on a developing country where pre-existing CG practices embodied in a cultural-
cognitive framework contradict with rule-based CG practices emanating from regulatory 
change. Under such legitimacy contention, firms maintain regulative legitimacy by reporting 
compliance in annual reports whilst maintaining cultural-cognitive legitimacy by not 
implementing the BCGG-2006 in reality. While attempting to maintain both kinds of 
legitimacy, firms take a calculated approach in respect to selection of provisions of the 
BCGG-2006, as demonstrated by systematic overstatement of compliance with respect to less 
observable provisions. Higher levels of information asymmetry associated with less 
observable provisions may constrain the BSEC and stock exchanges to reveal non-conformity 
between reported compliance and actual implementation with these provisions. 
Within this field, sponsor families are powerful actors due to their control over firms 
and close association with corrupted political leaders. By demonstrating a positive 
relationship between overstatement of compliance and family control, this study shows that 
the interplay between organizational culture and governance structures of family-controlled 
firms which are cognitively consistent with cultural-cognitive element of the country and the 
private benefits of control afforded to controlling sponsor families by existing formal 
institutional voids results in reluctance to change to a rule-based Anglo-American model. 
However, the positive association between overstatement of compliance in annual reports and 
family control is mainly driven by overstatement with less observable provisions.  
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Another important actor with a conflicting interest in sponsor families in this field is 
the independent institutional investors. This research demonstrates that the presence of a 
representative of an independent institutional investor on the board is negatively associated 
with overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-2006. Again the negative association 
between the presence of independent institutional investor directors on the board and 
overstatement of compliance is driven by the negative association between the presence of 
independent institutional investor directors on the board and overstatement of compliance 
with respect to less observable CG provisions. These results also remain valid when an 
analysis is carried out for family controlled firms only. These results may suggest that 
regulatory agencies such as the BSEC should promote more institutional investor 
representation on board of directors to augment congruence between compliance reported in 
annual reports and underlying compliance.
13
  
The findings of this study are also relevant to academics and practitioners. Based 
upon the results, it appears that contradiction between a regulative institution and the 
prevailing cultural and institutional characteristics of developing countries aid in a 
decoupling of stated intent and actual practice. This research thus questions prior research, 
based upon public disclosures, that tends to suggest that IFIs play an important role in 
developing accountability in developing countries (World Bank, 2009). Insights revealed by 
this study are also relevant to practitioners, particularly international investors who need to 
assess the CG constructs of developing markets in order to make informed investment 
decisions. They must seek validation of reported CG structures of companies from alternative 
sources before committing investments.  
The results of this study should be interpreted with caution outside the scope of 
developing countries, where the cultural profile is different and institutional voids do not 
exist and where external shareholder associations, financial analysts and regulatory agencies 
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are active enough to reveal underlying non-conformity with a CG code. Moreover, the results 
provide evidence of association of overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-2006 with 
family control and the presence of institutional investor presentative on the board. It is not 
possible to provide evidence of causality due to the dependence on survey data. Survey data 
are intrinsically cross-sectional (Van der Stede et al., 2005). Hence, several econometric tests 
of causality (e.g., the effect of change in control by sponsor families on change in 
overstatement of compliance with the BCGG-2006 in annual reports (Woodward, 2003:35-
36) cannot be performed.  
Finally, although the survey sample represents the distribution of the underlying 
population with respect to industry, family control, market capitalisation and total assets 
(Table 1), indicating that there is minimal concern around response bias, the respondents 
firms may still be those that better implement the BCGG-2006 in reality.  In that case, actual 
overstatement will be greater than the overstatement which this study reports and will not 
invalidate the main results of this study.   
Further research is needed to understand whether firms that overstate compliance with 
the BCGG-2006 in order to gain and maintain regulative legitimation are also able to gain 
CG legitimacy from other stakeholders such as shareholders. Following Zajak and Westphal 
(2004), this future study could investigate whether market participants discount share of firms 
that ‘window dress’ compliance in annual reports and thus, provide evidence on costs of 
‘window dressing’ of compliance.  Moreover, following Fiss & Zajak (2004), a closer 
examination of the history of sponsor family control in Bangladesh is needed, in order to 
improve the understanding of whether the presence of first or second (and subsequent) 
generations of sponsor family produces different outcomes with respect to overstatement of 
compliance with the BCGG-2006. Finally, the finding of this study with respect to the role of 
the institutional investors does not explicitly demonstrate how the presence of institutional 
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investors on the board incurs change towards an Anglo-American model of CG. A future 
study can investigate the process taken by institutional investor directors to ensure 
compliance with an Anglo-American model of CG and whether that process encourage firms 
to substantively adopt an Anglo-American model. 
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END NOTES 
1. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this line of thought. 
2. Bangladesh Bank, the central bank of Bangladesh, has long been stipulating that not 
more than one member of a family can sit in the same board (BRPD Circular No12 
April 26, 2003). A recent directive of Bangladesh Bank stipulates that any individual 
family directly or indirectly willing to hold 5 percent shares or more in any 
commercial bank needs to take prior permission from the Bangladesh Bank (BRPD 
Circular No15 November 3, 2014).  
3. The website of the mutual fund (http://www.aims-bangladesh.com/index.php), in the 
section ‘About us’, gives specific indications of adherence to Anglo-American 
features of governance, such as separation of ownership and management, and 
adherence to principles of the Chartered Financial Analysts Institute (CFA). In a 
presentation on corporate governance the CEO of the mutual fund specifically 
references the UK guidance on independent directors.  
4. The main questionnaire is available from the corresponding author. 
5. The names of company sectaries and address of headquarters of companies are 
retrieved from http://www.cdbl.com.bd/issuer_details.php on 31 December, 2011. 
6. Here is an example of two companies. Company A reported compliance with all 20 
provisions and does not use explanation for non-compliance, but in survey it stated 
that it comply with 18 provisions. Company B reported compliance with 19 
provisions and used explanation for non-compliance with one provision but in the 
survey, it stated that it comply with 18 provisions. The overstatement measure for A is 
= (20-18)/20 = 0.10 while the overstatement measure for Company B is = (19-18)/19 
= 0.0526. As company B used explanation for non-compliance, it has a lower 
overstatement value than company A which gives no explanation. 
7. See Wooldridge (2002) p. 671 on linearization of a truncated distribution.  
8. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this analysis. 
9. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this analysis. 
10. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this point. 
11. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this analysis. 
12. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this analysis. 
13. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this point. 
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TABLE 1 
Provisions of the BCGG-2006 and Their Classifications 
Corporate Governance Provision Nature of provision 
Board size (min 5, max 20) Observable 
Independent directors (10% with a minimum of one) Observable 
Separation of chairman and CEO Observable 
Define the respective roles and responsibilities of the chairman 
and CEO 
Less observable 
Board meetings (at least four per year) Observable 
An audit committee is constituted Observable 
Written charter for audit committee Less observable 
Audit committee size (at least three directors) Observable 
Presence of an independent director on audit committee Observable 
Appointment of the chairman of audit committee Observable 
Professional qualification of the chairman of audit committee Less observable 
Audit committee meetings (at least four per year) Less observable 
Audit committee reports its activities to the board of directors  Less observable 
Audit Committee evaluates the effectiveness of internal control 
systems  
Less observable 
Appointment of CFO  Observable 
The CFO attends board meetings Less observable 
A written charter specifying roles, responsibilities and duties of 
the CFO 
Less observable 
Appointment of Head of Internal Auditor  Less observable 
A written charter specifying roles, responsibilities and duties of 
the Head of Internal Auditor 
Less observable 
External auditor has not been engaged in non-audit services Less observable 
This table presents CG provisions which are the subject of this study.  Observable provisions are easily 
verifiable or subject to strong monitoring by regulatory authorities such as the BSEC and stock exchanges.  
Less-observable provisions are related to internal practices of a company and thus are relatively less visible to 
an outside individual or organization.  An audit committee chairman holds a qualification in accounting or 
finance if he has either a professional qualification in accounting such as FCA, FCMA and PhD in Accounting 
or has held a senior management position (e.g. Chairman or CEO) with another public limited company or 
financial institution but has not held that position due to his/her shareholding. 
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TABLE 2 
Response Bias Tests 
 Populationb  Samplec 
  n Percentage   n Percentage 
(a)    Industry Sector
 
      
Cement 6 4.41  4 4.4 
Ceramics 5 3.68  5 5.49 
Engineering 22 16.18  13 14.29 
Food 16 11.76  9 9.89 
Fuel and Power 13 9.56  9 9.89 
IT 5 3.68  3 3.3 
Jute 3 2.21  2 2.2 
Miscellaneous 9 6.62  5 5.49 
Paper and Printing 1 0.73  0 0 
Pharmaceuticals 20 14.71  16 17.57 
Services and Real Estate 4 2.94  3 3.3 
Tannery 5 3.68  4 4.4 
Telecommunications 1 0.73  1 1.1 
Textile 25 18.38  17 18.68 
Travel and Leisure 1 0.73  0 0 
Total 136 100  91 100 
(b) Family Control
a
 
     
Family control 76 55.88 
 
47 51.64 
No family control 60 44.12 
 
44 48.36 
Total 136 100  91 100 
(c) Market Capitalization
a 
      
First quartile 38 27.94  18 19.78 
Second quartile 35 25.74  21 23.08 
Third quartile 33 24.26  27 29.67 
Fourth quartile 30 22.06  25 27.47 
Total 136 100  91 100 
(d) Total Assets
a
       
First quartile 38 27.94  17 18.68 
Second quartile 35 25.74  23 25.28 
Third quartile 32 23.53  25 27.47 
Fourth quartile 31 22.79  26 28.57 
Total 136 100  91 100 
Notes: 
a
Chi-squre tests of significant difference between population and sample based on family control 
(χ2=1.99; p=0.157) market capitalization group (χ2=2.89; p=0.409) and total assets group (χ2=2.99; p=0.392) 
are not rejected. 
b
Population consists of 136 non-financial companies listed on Dhaka Stock Exchange, Bangladesh on 31 
December, 2011. 
c
Sample consists of 91 companies that respond to the survey conducted in January – March, 2012. 
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TABLE 3 
Variable Description 
Variables Description 
Linearized overstated 
compliance 
Log (1 + Overstated CG). 
Linearized overstated 
compliance of observable  
provisions 
Log (1 + Overstated observable CG). 
Linearized overstated 
compliance of less 
observable provisions 
Log (1 + Overstated less observable CG). 
Finance raised The ratio of additional cash raised from issuance of 
equity, preferred stock and long-term debt to average 
total assets at the end of the company’s accounting 
period in 2011. 
Firm size The natural logarithm of book value of total assets at the 
end of the company’s accounting period in 2011. 
ROA_1 Proxy for prior year profitability, is the ratio between net 
profit before extraordinary items and average total assets 
at the end of the last accounting period.  
Market-to-book Proxy for growth opportunity, is the ratio of the firm’s 
market value of common equity to book value of 
common equity at the end of the company’s accounting 
period in 2011.  
Family control A dummy variable indicating the sponsor family owns at 
least 20 percent of ownership and sponsor family 
members hold the positions of both chairman and CEO; 
0 otherwise. 
Institutional investor director A dummy variable indicating the presence of at least one 
institutional investor director on the board; 0 otherwise. 
Audit quality A dummy variable equals 1 if the audit firm of the 
company is affiliated with international big-four audit 
firms, 0 otherwise.  
Export-oriented industry Proxy for the firm’s dependence on western buyers, is a 
dummy variable equals 1 if the firm belongs to textile or 
pharmaceutical industry and otherwise 0. 
This table presents definitions of variables used for testing the association of overstatement of compliance 
with family control and the presence of institutional investor directors on the board of directors. 
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TABLE 4 
Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
Panel B: Continuous variables      
Compliance as reported in AR 16.25 17.00 3.47 3.00 20.00 
Compliance as stated in survey 11.04 11.00 4.98 3.00 20.00 
Overstated compliance 0.32 0.31 0.25 0.00 0.82 
Compliance with observable 
provisions as reported in AR 7.98 9.00 1.73 3.00 9.00 
Compliance with observable 
provisions as stated in survey 6.66 8.00 2.37 2.00 9.00 
Overstated compliance of observable 
provisions  0.16 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.67 
Compliance with less observable 
provisions as reported in AR 8.31 9.00 2.09 0.00 11.00 
Compliance with less observable 
provisions as stated in survey 4.38 4.00 3.22 0.00 11.00 
Overstated compliance of less 
observable provisions 0.48 0.50 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Linearized overstated compliance 0.26 0.27 0.19 0.00 0.60 
Linearized overstated compliance of 
observable provisions 
0.13 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.51 
Linearized overstated compliance of 
less observable 
0.37 0.41 0.23 0.00 0.69 
Finance raised 0.08 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.80 
Firm size 21.44 21.45 1.62 17.32 25.41 
ROA_1 10.93 8.89 8.82 -10.29 36.88 
Market-to-book 4.45 3.04 6.25 0.22 55.46 
     
Panel B: Dichotomous variables 
    
 
1.00 0 
Family control 47 (51.64%) 44 (48.36%) 
Institutional investor director 21 (20.08%) 70 (76.92%) 
Audit quality 24 (26.37%) 67 (73.63%) 
Export-oriented industry 33 (36.26%) 58 (63.74%) 
Sample size = 91 firms.  Compliance as reported in AR and Compliance as stated in survey are CG compliance 
indices of 20 provisions of the BCGG-2006. Overstated compliance is the difference between Compliance as 
reported in AR and Compliance as stated in survey scaled by Compliance as reported in AR.  Compliance with 
observable provisions as reported in AR and Compliance with observable provisions as stated in survey are 
CG compliance indices of nine observable provisions of the BCGG-2006.  Overstated compliance of 
observable provisions is the difference between Compliance with observable provisions as reported in AR and 
Compliance with observable provisions as stated in survey scaled by Compliance with observable provisions 
as reported in AR.  Compliance with less observable provisions as reported in AR and Compliance with less 
observable provisions as stated in the survey are CG compliance indices of 11 relatively less observable 
provisions of the BCGG-2006.  Overstated compliance of less observable provisions is the difference between 
Compliance with less observable provisions as reported in AR and Compliance with less observable provisions 
as stated in the survey scaled by Compliance less observable provisions as reported in AR.  The definitions of 
the remaining variables are detailed in Table 3. 
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TABLE 5 
Univariate Tests Comparing Overstated compliance and Hypothesized Values 'μ = 0 and 
Median = 0'. 
  Overstated 
compliance 
Hypothesized value t/z value p-value 
Mean
a
 0.319 0.000 12.24 0.000*** 
Median
b
 0.310 0.000 8.039 0.000*** 
Sample is 91 firms.  Overstated compliance is the difference between compliance as reported in annual reports and 
Compliance as stated in the survey scaled by Compliance as reported in annual reports.   
a
Difference in means is tested by using one-sample t-tests. 
b
Difference in medians is tested by using Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. 
*** Significant at 0.001 level (one-tail). 
 
 
TABLE 6 
Univariate Tests Comparing Compliance as reported in annual reports and Compliance 
as stated in the survey 
  
Compliance as 
reported in AR 
Compliance as 
stated in survey 
t/z value 
p-value 
Mean
a
 16.25 11.04 11.58 0.000*** 
Median
b
 17.00 11.00    8.043 0.000*** 
Sample is 91 firms. Compliance as reported in AR and Compliance as stated in survey are CG compliance 
indices of 20 provisions of the BCGG-2006. 
a
Difference in means is tested by using pair t-tests. 
b
Difference in medians is tested by using Wilcoxon matched-pair  signed-rank tests. 
*** Significant at 0.01 level (one-tail). 
 
 
TABLE 7 
Univariate Tests Comparing Overstated compliance of less observable provisions and 
Overstated compliance of observable provisions. 
  Overstated  
compliance of  
less observable 
provisions 
Overstated 
compliance of 
observable 
 provisions 
t/z value p-value 
Mean
a
 0.479 0.156 10.71 0.000*** 
Median
b
 0.500 0.000 7.263 0.000*** 
Sample is 89 firms.  Overstated compliance of less observable provisions is the difference between 
Compliance with less observable provisions as reported in the annual reports and Compliance with less 
observable provisions as stated in the survey scaled by Compliance with less observable provisions as reported 
in the annual reports.  Overstated compliance of observable provisions is the difference between Compliance 
with observable provisions as reported in the annual reports, and Compliance with observable provisions as 
stated in the survey scaled by Compliance with observable provisions as reported in the annual reports. 
aDifference in means is tested by using pair t-tests. 
bDifference in medians is tested by using Wilcoxon matched-pair singed-rank tests. 
***Significant at the 0.001 level (one-tail). 
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TABLE 8 
Test of Differences in Means of Independent and Control Variables 
Panel A   Overstated compliance  
     Group   
  Mean   NO   YES t-value 
Family control 0.52  0.25  0.57 (-2.40)*** 
Institutional investor director 0.23  0.38  0.20 (1.51)* 
Financed raised 0.08  0.04  0.09 (-1.04) 
Firm size 21.44  22.53  21.21 (3.08)*** 
ROA_1 10.93  21.47  8.67 (6.29)*** 
Market-to-book 4.45  5.07  4.33 -0.43 
Audit quality 0.26  0.75  0.16 (5.56)*** 
Export-oriented industry 0.36  0.43  0.35 -0.68 
              
Panel B Overstated compliance of 
observable provisions 
Overstated compliance of 
less observable provisions 
 Group t-value Group t-value 
 NO YES  NO YES  
Family control 0.42 0.67 (-2.36)** 0.27 0.58 (-2.26)** 
Institutional investor director 0.31 0.11 (2.23)** 0.40 0.20 (1.65)* 
Finance raised 0.05 0.12 (-1.67)* 0.04 0.09 (-0.97) 
Firm size 21.91 20.72 (3.65)*** 22.71 21.24 (3.43)*** 
ROA_1 13.05 7.68 (2.95)*** 21.62 8.81 (6.31)*** 
Market-to-book 3.62 5.74 (-1.59)* 5.17 4.36 (-0.45) 
Audit quality 0.40 0.05 (3.90)*** 0.80 0.16 (5.95)*** 
Export-oriented industry 0.33 0.42 (-0.86) 0.47 0.35 -0.84 
       
This table presents the mean difference of independent variables for Overstated CG in Panel A and the same 
for overstated observable CG and overstated less observable CG in Panel B. The definitions of variables are 
detailed in Table 3. 
Difference in means is tested by using t-tests. T-values are in parentheses. 
***, * Significant at the 0.001 and 0.10 level respectively (one-tail). 
 
 
 
 
60 
 
TABLE 9 
Estimated Results 
 Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
Dependent variables Linearized overstated 
compliance 
Linearized overstated 
compliance of observable 
Linearized overstated 
compliance of less 
observable 
Explanatory variables      
 Intercept 1.097*** (0.211) 0.968 (0.591) 1.582*** (0.257) 
Family control 0.135*** (0.033) 0.134 (0.099) 0.155*** (0.039) 
Institutional investor director -0.092*** (0.034) -0.162 (0.112) -0.098** (0.04) 
Finance raised 0.136* (0.073) 0.249 (0.203) 0.129 (0.085) 
Firm size -0.038*** (0.009) -0.046* (0.027) -0.053*** (0.012) 
ROA_1 -0.004** (0.002) -0.002 (0.006) -0.005** (0.002) 
Audit quality -0.184*** (0.036) -0.363*** (0.135) -0.23*** (0.042) 
Market-to-book - 0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.006) - 0.004 (0.003) 
Export-oriented industry -0.030 (0.032) -0.018 (0.091) -0.049 (0.036) 
Number of observations 91 91 89 
Pseudo R
2
 4.9939 0.3368 2.1112 
LR chi-square statistics 103.96*** 34.00*** 111.53*** 
This table presents the results based on Tobit regression. The definitions of variables are detailed in Table 3.  
***, **, * coefficients are statistically significant at 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level respectively.  
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